

Message Text

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SUBJ: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TECHNICAL TALKS: JUNE 25 WORKING GROUP

NATO FOR SCOWCROFT, SONNENFELDT, EAGLEBURGER, LODAL

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: STOESSEL REMOVED THE US BRACKETS ON PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE III AND DELETED THE US PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE III FROM THE DRAFT TREATY. HE RE-EMPHASIZED TO MOROKHOV THE NEED FOR YIELD CALIBRATION DATA BASED ON POAST SHOTS. MOROKHOV EXPLAINED THAT PAST SHOTS WERE COVERED BY LAW AGAINST THEIR DISCLOSURE, THIS LAW COULD NOT BE CHANGED RETROACTIVELY AND ANY CHANGES IN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT. STOESSEL PROPOSED AN ADJOURNMENT IN THE TALKS FOR THE SUMMIT. ROMNEY PROBED SOVIET VIEWS ON HOW SOVIET IDEAS ON SPECIFIC TESTING AREAS BEAR ON DATA REQUIREMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A SMALL-GROUP MEETING STOESSEL REFERRED TO HIS REMARKS YESTERDAY ON OUR POSSIBLE INTEREST IN A JOINT SEISMIC NETWORK. WHILE HE FELT THIS WAS A COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR WE SHOULD CONSIDER, HE MADE CLEAR IT WAS NOT A US REQUIREMENT FOR CONCLUSION OF A TREATY. HE THEREFORE REMOVED THE BRACKETS FROM PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE III RESERVING THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THESE OR ANY OTHER ARTICLES IN THE FUTURE.

3. TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF ARTICLE III, STOESSEL SAID WE WERE WILLING TO DELETE THIS PROPOSED PROVISION FROM THE DRAFT,

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PROVIDED WE WE SHARE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH STATIONS

WILL BE USED TO VERIFY A THRESHOLD TEST LIMITATION. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, MOROKHOV STATED THAT THE USE OF SUCH STATIONS WAS RESERVED TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. STOESSEL SAID THAT, IN VIEW OF OUR COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THIS, THE US WOULD DELETE THE PARAGRAPH.

4. MOROKHOV NEXT BROACHED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DRAFT TREATY. HE ASKED WHY WE HAD BRACKETED JANUARY 1, 1976, IN ARTICLE I, WHEN IT HAD NOT BEEN BRACKETED IN OUR FIRST READING. STOESSEL SAID THAT HE HAD BRACKETED IT ON INSTRUCTIONS. THE MATTER WAS UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND IN ANY EVENT WE BELIEVED THAT THE EFFECTIVE DATE, WHATEVER IT MIGHT BE, BELONGED IN ARTICLE V.

5. MOROKHOV NEXT POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD DELETED THE REFERENCE TO AGREED TEST SITES IN ARTICLE II, SO THAT IT NO LONGER APPEARED IN THE TREATY OR PROTOCOL. DID BOTH SIDES STILL SHARE AN UNDERSTANDING IN THIS MATTER? STOESSEL SAID THAT WE DID, THAT WE WOULD STUDY THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL WITH HIS REMARKS IN MIND, AND IF IN FACT THIS PROVISION WAS NO LONGER COVERED, WE WOULD SUGGEST LANGUAGE TO COVER IT.

6. MOROKHOV ASKED WHETHER THE US FOOTNOTE ON ACCESSION STILL STOOD. STOESSEL POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT WAS STILL UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON. HE ASSUMED THE US WOULD FAVOR SOME SORT OF ACCESSION PROVISION, IN VIEW OF THE LANGUAGE CHANGES WE HAD SUGGESTED IN THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF THE TREATY, BUT FOR THE PRESENT THE FOOTNOTE STILL STOOD.

7. STOESSEL THEN TURNED TO THE NEED FOR YIELD CALIBRATION DATA ON PAST SHOTS TO INSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. HE SAID OUR PURPOSE IN TAKING THIS POSITION WAS SIMPLY TO AID VERIFICATION, AND FOR NO OTHER REASON. WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A REASONABLE NUMBER OF SHOTS WHICH COULD BE SELECTED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT DIVULGE SENSITIVE INFORMATION. HE ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN SUCH A STRONG POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO THE PROVISION OF SUCH DATA.

8. MOROKHOV SAID THE FORMAL REASON FOR THE SOVIET POSITION WAS
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THAT THERE WAS A LAW WHICH PROHIBITED THE DIVULGENCE OF SUCH INFORMATION. AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER, SOVIET EXPERTS HAD SHOWN THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT SUCH INFORMATION. DATA ON PAST YIELDS WOULD NOT AID IN VERIFYING AN AGREEMENT. RETURNING TO THE LEGAL ASPECT, HE SAID THE LAW COULD BE CHANGED FOR THE FUTURE AND IF IT WERE CHANGED IT WOULD BE WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY SUCH INFORMATION WOULD BE EXCHANGED PRIVATELY

BETWEEN US AND WOULD NOT BE PUBLICLY DIVULGED.

9. STOESSEL NEXT REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSION OF YESTERDAY WITH MOROKHOV ON ADJOURNMENT. HE SUGGESTED ADJOURNMENT WITH A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION AFTER THE SUMMIT. HE POINTED OUT THAT SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE US DELEGATION - NAMELY, TERRELL, ROMNEY AND HERRIN -- WOULD REMAIN IN MOSCOW FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, SO THAT DISCUSSIONS COULD CONTINUE IF NECESSARY. MOROKHOV SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE SUGGESTED ADJOURNMENT TO HIS SUPERIORS AND THAT THE US DELEGATION MEMBERS STOESSEL HAD NAMED WOULD BE WELCOME TO REMAIN IN MOSCOW. STOESSEL AND MOROKHOV AGREED TO HAVE A PLENARY SESSION AT 10:00 A.M. JUNE 26.

10. EXPERTS THEN JOINED THE MEETING. IN DISCUSSION OF DRAFT PROTOCOL, US RESERVATIONS CONCERNING WORDING OF SOVIET PARAGRAPH 3 AND US PARAGRAPH 4 WERE NOTED, AND CHANGE IN TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 5 WAS ACCOMPLISHED, AS INSTRUCTED IN STATE 135408. IN ADDITION, WORDING OF US VERSION OF FINAL PARAGRAPH WAS CHANGED TO INSERT "INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION" FOR "WRITTEN NOTICES OF ACCEPTANCE." NO OTHER COMMENTS WERE GIVEN OR RECEIVED ON SPECIFIC LANGUAGE FOR PROTOCOL.

2. US DELEGATES SROBED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL DATA WHICH SOVIETS PROPOSE TO PROVIDE. SOVIETS STATED THAT: (A) GENERAL GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION ON TEST SITES WOULD NOT BE GIVEN, (B) ALL FUTURE TESTS WILL OCCUR IN "TESTING AREAS" OF LIMITED SIZE ON THE TEST SITES, INCLUDING TESTS BELOW THEIR LOWER THRESHOLD AS WELL AS WITHIN THEIR QUOTA, (C) GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL DATA OVER GEOPHYSICALLY HOMOGENEOUS UNITS, AND BOUNDARIES OF SUCH UNITS, WILL BE PROVIDED FOR EACH TESTING AREA AND FOR ANY FUTURE TESTING AREA (D) GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL DATA WILL BE AVERAGED OVER HOMOGENEOUS UNITS, (E) DEPTHS WILL NOT BE GIVEN FOR EACH TEST AND (F) DATA WILL BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE SEISMIC COUPLING FACTOR WITH ADEQUATE PRECISION FOR VERIFICATION. GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION WAS CONFIRMED TO CONSIST OF STRATIGRAPHIC SECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON GEOLOGY OF TESTING AREAS, AND TABULATED DATA ON GEOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS SUCH AS POROSITY, DENSITY, ETC.

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3. IN EXTENDED DISCUSSION ON EFFECT OF DEPTH ON YIELD ESTIMATES SOVIET TECHNICAL POSITION BECAME CLEAR AS FOLLOWS: (A) FOR YIELDS NEAR WHAT SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND FOR UPPER THRESHOLD, DEPTHS REQUIRED FOR CONTAINMENT ARE SO GREAT THAT WATER CONTENT AND OTHER GEOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS AFFECTING COUPOING ARE ALMOST INVARIANT WITH DEPTH AND ALMOST INDEPENDENT OF TYPE OF ROCK, (B) MINIMUM DEPTH CAN BE ESTIMATED FROM CONTAINMENT CRITERIA

USING SEISMIC MAGNITUDE FOR FIRST APPROXIMATION OF YIELD,
(C) FROM THIS DEPTH ESTIMATE, EFFECT ON MAGNITUDE OF SEISMIC
REFLECTION FROM SURFACE ABOVE EXPLOSION CAN BE CALCULATED AND
MORE ACCURATE YIELD CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH IS SUFFICIENT FOR
VERIFICATION OF UPPER THRESHOLD, (D) LOWER YIELD EXPLOSIONS
CAN OCCUR AT LESSER DEPTHS WHERE GREATER COUPLING VARIABILITY
IS POSSIBLE AND DEPTH DETERMINATION BY SEISMIC MEANS IS LESS
ACCURATE, BUT THESE EFFECTS CAUSE ERRORS OF ONLY A FACTOR OF
TWO IN YIELD IF GEOLOGY IS KNOWN, AND (E) SMALLER YIELDS ARE
OF LESSER CONCERN. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT A PRECISE STATEMENT
ON DEPTH AMOUNTS TO A PRECISE STATEMENT ON DESIGN YIELD THROUGH
CONTAINMENT SCALING LAW.
STOESSEL

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